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Implications of Transaction Costs for the Post-Earnings-Announcement 
Drift 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper examines the effect of transaction costs on the post-earnings-announcement 
drift (PEAD). Using standard market microstructure features we show that transaction 
costs constrain the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate earnings information 
into price. This leads to weaker return responses at the time of the earnings 
announcement and higher subsequent returns drift for firms with high transaction costs. 
Consistent with this prediction, we find that earnings response coefficients are lower for 
firms with higher transaction costs. Using portfolio analyses, we find that the profits of 
implementing the PEAD trading strategy are significantly reduced by transaction costs. In 
addition, we show, using a combination of portfolio and regression analyses, that firms 
with higher transaction costs are the ones that provide the higher abnormal returns for the 
PEAD strategy. Our results indicate that transaction costs can provide an explanation not 
only for the persistence but also for the existence of PEAD.  
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1.  Introduction 
Post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) is the empirical finding that risk-
adjusted returns drift in the direction of the earnings surprises in the months following 
earnings announcements (Ball and Brown [1968], Foster, Olsen, Shevlin [1984], Bernard 
and Thomas [1989, 1990]). Though it is possible that profitable trading opportunities 
could be uncovered from time to time, arbitrage theory suggests that informed investors 
acquainted with the PEAD literature should have arbitraged away the PEAD. Despite 
some evidence that transaction costs limit arbitrage in the PEAD setting (e.g., Bernard 
and Thomas [1989, 1990], Bhushan [1994]), transaction costs have not been used to 
provide an explanation for the existence of the PEAD.   
A key innovation in our paper is that we rely on standard features in the market 
microstructure literature to analyze how transaction costs can offer a rationale for PEAD 
(section 2 describes our analyses in more detail). Prior studies that have examined the 
implications of transaction costs for PEAD generally argue that there is mispricing due to 
misvaluation by less informed investors and that informed investors are unable to fully 
correct the mispricing because of transaction costs (e.g., Bhushan [1994], Chordia et al. 
[2007]). Unlike these studies, we do not assume mispricing and do not treat transaction 
costs as a ‘black box’ that limits arbitrage. Instead we rely on the market microstructure 
literature to examine the impact of transaction costs on the process of price discovery 
(Lee [2001]). We show how transaction costs constrain profitable trades by informed 
investors that are required to drive the convergence of market price to fundamental value 
at the time of the earnings announcement. This leads to the initial underreaction to 
earnings news. When post-announcement private or public value-relevant news makes it 
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profitable for informed traders to resume trading, their trades then move the market price 
towards the fundamental value, i.e., this is observed as the post-earnings–announcement-
drift.  
In our empirical analyses, we follow prior literature (e.g., Lesmond, Schill, and 
Zhou [2004], Korajczyk and Sadka [2004], Hanna and Ready [2005]) and use relative 
bid-ask spreads plus commissions as direct estimates of the transaction costs of making 
round-trip marginal trades. We also use an alternative measure of transaction costs 
developed by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka [1999]. This measure offers a possibly 
more comprehensive estimate of transaction costs that includes price impact and 
opportunity costs (e.g., immediacy costs), and has also been used in Lesmond et al. 
[2004] to examine the profitability of momentum-based trading strategies.  
Our first prediction is that the market reaction to earnings surprises is smaller for 
firms whose shares have higher transaction costs. Thus, we examine the initial market 
response to earnings surprises for firms with different transaction costs. We find that 
firms whose shares have higher transaction costs experience smaller reactions to their 
earnings surprises. This is consistent with our prediction that transaction costs discourage 
the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price. 
Our second prediction is that the drift in returns is larger for firms whose shares 
have higher transaction costs. Consistent with this hypothesis we find that, while the 
average transaction costs of the shares of all firms are relatively low, the transaction costs 
of the shares of the firms in the extreme earnings surprises portfolios are high. Taking 
into account these transaction costs significantly reduces the profitability of the trades 
made in these portfolios. For instance, the PEAD strategy using extreme decile portfolios 
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generates 12-month equal-weighted size-adjusted returns of 11.92% from 1988 to 2005. 
However, the estimated profits reduce to 3.36% after the deduction of our most 
conservative estimate of transaction costs, measured as the sum of relative effective 
spreads and commissions. In further portfolio analyses, we find that firms with higher 
costs are the ones that provide the higher abnormal returns for the PEAD strategy 
(measured before transactions costs). For instance, the PEAD strategy among firms in the 
top (bottom) quintile of transaction costs generates 12-month size-adjusted returns of 
14.61% (3.07%). The increase in returns, however, is associated with an increase in costs, 
and, despite the much higher abnormal returns, the estimated profits (measured after 
transactions costs) are statistically insignificant and sometimes negative. For example, the 
PEAD strategy among firms in the top (bottom) quintile of costs earns a net profit of 
1.02% (1.84%).  
We also investigate the effect of transaction costs on PEAD after controlling for 
other determinants of PEAD. This is important because Mendenhall [2004], unlike 
Bhushan [1994], finds no evidence that stock price (as a proxy for transaction costs) 
affects the magnitude of the PEAD. We find a similar lack of significant association 
between stock price and the PEAD in our empirical analyses. However, when we use our 
more direct measures of transaction costs, we find clear evidence that firms with higher 
transaction costs have larger PEAD. We conjecture that the difference in results with 
regards to transaction costs is due to the fact that price is a crude proxy for transaction 
costs. Similar to Mendenhall, we also find that arbitrage risk limits arbitrage. 
Finally, to assess the robustness of our transaction cost explanation, we study the 
effects of transaction costs on alternative settings where there is a drift in returns. First, 
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we apply our approach to the drift following revenue surprises and a combination of 
revenue surprises and earnings surprises (Jegadeesh and Livnat [2006]). We find that 
transaction costs account for most of the abnormal returns of these strategies. Second, we 
investigate the effect of transaction costs in the recent PEAD literature that uses analyst 
forecasts as the earnings expectation benchmark (Livnat and Mendenhall [2006], Doyle, 
Lundholm, and Soliman [2006]). While transaction costs explain a significant proportion 
of the returns of this strategy, economically and statistically abnormal returns remain 
feasible. Given that this innovation has only recently appeared in the academic literature, 
a potential explanation is that insufficient informed trading has developed for prices to 
move fully to the transaction cost bounds. In fact, we provide some evidence that the 
abnormal returns of this strategy have decreased in more recent years and that the 
magnitude of the abnormal returns appears to have converged to the magnitude of the 
transaction costs. 
Our results are consistent with a recent working paper by Chordia et al [2007]. 
Neither our paper nor Chordia et al. are the first to show that the magnitude of PEAD is 
increasing in the magnitude of proxies for transaction costs - Bernard and Thomas [1989] 
and Bhushan [1994] have provided some early evidence of this relation. The contribution 
of both papers lies in the fact that both our paper and Chordia et al. are able to measure 
transaction costs more explicitly and this allows us to quantify the profitability of the 
PEAD strategy. However, the unique contribution of our paper is to use a market 
microstructure framework to show how transaction costs constrain informed traders from 
fully reacting to earnings news and to explain how the resumption of trading after the 
earnings announcement by these traders could lead to predictable drifts in returns. In this 
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sense, our study shows that transaction costs can provide an explanation not only for the 
persistence but also for the existence of PEAD. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
implications of transaction costs for the speed in which the market reflects the 
information in earnings announcements. Section 3 describes the sample selection and the 
data. Section 4 presents the research design and the results of our analyses. Section 5 
presents results from analyses that use analysts’ earnings forecasts to compute earnings 
surprises. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Transaction costs and the existence of the PEAD 
In this section, we explain how market processes related to transaction costs can 
result in an initial underreaction at the earnings announcement and in a predictable post-
announcement drift in returns. The discussion is motivated by Diamond and Verrecchia 
[1987] who demonstrate theoretically how short-sale restrictions and costs constrain 
informed trades on the sell side when there is bad news. As a result of this constraint, 
market prices do not immediately converge to the true value when there is bad news (i.e., 
there is underreaction to bad news) and the speed of the price convergence is also a 
function of the constraints. We extend the economic intuition of Diamond and Verrecchia 
to analyze how transaction costs on both the buy and the sell sides lead to an 
underreaction to good news and bad news, respectively. In addition, we illustrate how 
transaction costs lead to subsequent market correction (i.e., to the PEAD).  
In our analyses, we rely on three standard and descriptive features in the market 
microstructure literature. First, market makers are less informed than informed traders 
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such that market makers do not value firms directly, say from firm disclosures, but infer 
firm value from observing order flow and imbalances (Kyle [1985], Glosten and Milgrom 
[1985], Kim and Verrecchia [1994]). Further, they adjust the bid-ask prices by observing 
the net order flow arising from trades.1 Second, informed traders trade only if the 
marginal value of the accumulated information exceeds the marginal cost of trading 
(Garman and Ohlson [1980], Lesmond et. al [1999], Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang [2004]). 
Third, informed trades result in permanent price movements whereas uninformed trades, 
e.g., liquidity trades, just create noise in the trading process and do not have a permanent 
effect on price (e.g., Kyle [1985], Hasbrouck [1991]).2 The lack of price impact of 
liquidity trades may be due to the fact that these trades tend to be small and/or that the 
buy and sell trades often cross. 
Our analysis also relies on the idea that informed traders can trade on their ability 
to quickly process public disclosures into tradable private information (Glosten and 
Milgrom [1985], Kim and Verrecchia [1994]). For example, Glosten and Milgrom [1985, 
p. 77] state that they refer to “the informed traders as insiders, even though other 
interpretations are possible, for example, they may merely be individuals who are 
particularly skilful in processing public information.” This argument is supported by 
empirical evidence of immediate sharp price and volume reactions to public earnings 
announcements (Lee [1992]), of increases in informed trading during earnings 
announcements (Lee, Mucklow, and Ready [1993], Krinsky and Lee [1996]), and of 
                                                 
1 We note that the fact that researchers have been consistently able to empirically document a drift in 
returns suggests that market makers are not adjusting prices to fundamental values. 
2 In fact, trades by uninformed traders may be necessary to create sufficient noise in the order flow to 
camouflage trades by the informed traders and to compensate market makers for losses suffered while 
trading with informed investors (Kyle [1985]). 
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PEAD-related trades by transient institutional investors (Ke and Ramalingegowda 
[2005]). 
2.1 UNDERREACTION TO EARNINGS NEWS  
To illustrate how transactions costs can lead to an underreaction to earnings news, 
we assume that a firm makes an earnings announcement that reflects an increase in its 
fundamental value from a pre-announcement price of $100 per share to a post-
announcement price of $105 per share. For simplicity, we further assume that the only 
transaction cost is a bid-ask spread of $2, i.e., the pre-announcement bid (ask) price is 
$99 ($101).3 The market price is the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, i.e., $100.   
After learning the positive earnings news, an arbitrageur will start buying the 
shares of the firm because it is profitable to do so at the current market price of $100. In 
response, the market maker will then start increasing the bid-ask prices until the market 
price reaches $103 (i.e., bid and ask prices are at $102 and $104, respectively).4 At this 
point, the expected price increase of $2 to the fundamental value of $105 is equal to the 
transaction cost of $2 and any further trades will result in losses. Hence, transaction costs 
create an upper bound to the upward price response to good earnings news such that there 
is an underreaction to news. Further, the underreaction will be larger if the firm has 
higher transaction costs. For example, if we assume transaction costs of $4 (instead of 
                                                 
3 If other transaction costs such as brokerage commissions or information acquisition costs are considered, 
our analyses imply that the underreaction and the post-announcement drift are likely to be more severe. In 
the extreme, total transaction costs may be so high that informed trades may not occur and market prices 
will not adjust at the time of the earnings announcement. 
4 For example, when observing net buy trades, the market maker increases the bid (ask) price to $101.01 
($103.01), then to $101.02 ($103.02), and so on and so forth, until the bid (ask) price is at $102 ($104). 
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$2), then our analyses imply that market price will only move to $101 (instead of $103) 
during the earnings announcement.5 
The above analyses of how transactions costs can lead to an underreaction to 
earnings news is also important in addressing one of the questions in Bernard and 
Thomas [1990, p. 33] who argue that if trades occur around earnings announcements, 
then the prices should fully reflect the fundamental value. We argue that trades by 
informed investors can occur, but the information about fundamental value need not be 
fully impounded into price since transaction costs creates bounds to trades. Further, 
trades can also occur as long as uninformed traders continue to trade (e.g., for liquidity 
reasons). 
Based on the above analyses, our first prediction is that the market reaction to 
earnings surprises will be smaller for firms whose shares have higher transaction costs. 
2.2 POST-ANNOUNCEMENT PRICE CONVERGENCE 
Next, we discuss how the initial underreaction leads to a future drift in returns. 
This point is important because, although Bernard and Thomas [1989, p.33] acknowledge 
that transaction costs might lead to the initial market underreaction, they raise the 
question of whether transaction costs can lead to the observed post-announcement drift as 
transaction costs should also hinder post-announcement trading. We now show that post-
announcement private or public news available to the arbitrageur can lead to price 
convergence even in the presence of transaction costs. The key to the price convergence 
is that the arbitrageur resumes trading only when it is profitable for him or her to do so. 
                                                 
5 Following a similar logic, one can show that in the case of bad earnings news, transaction costs create a 
lower bound that prevents prices from fully moving down to the new lower fundamental value. 
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We continue with the illustration from section 2.1. Assume that in the post-
announcement period, the arbitrageur receives some news about the firm. For simplicity, 
we assume that the expected value of the news is equal to zero, i.e., there is a 50% chance 
that the news is good news of $2 per share and a 50% chance of bad news of $2 per 
share.6 If the news is positive, then it increases the fundamental value by $2 to $107. In 
this case it becomes profitable to buy the stock because the expected price increase of $4 
($107-$103) is more than the round-trip transaction cost of $2. So the arbitrageur 
continues to buy until the market price reaches $105. In contrast, if the news is negative 
and reduces the fundamental value by $2 to $103, it is not profitable to trade the stock at 
the current market price of $103 and the price remains at $103. Hence, the market price is 
expected to increase to $104 (50% x $105 + 50% x $103) despite the fact that positive 
and negative news are random. 
An extrapolation of the above illustration is that a series of such post-
announcement random news makes the expected market price converge to the 
fundamental value at the earnings announcement of $105 in a process that we may 
empirically observe as a drift in returns. Further, if the news is larger in magnitude, e.g., 
good or bad news of $5 per share, there will be complete price convergence to $105 since 
the market price will move to $108 ($105 + $5 - $2) after good news or to $102 ($105 - 
$5 + $2) after bad news. This results in an expected price of $105. We note that the above 
analysis also provides a potential explanation for the concentration of abnormal returns 
                                                 
6 The assumption of equal probabilities of good and bad news is without loss of generality. The analysis 
holds for any probability of good news greater than zero. In fact, if good news are positively autocorrelated 
(i.e., the probability of good news conditional on a prior good news is greater than 50%), then the price 
convergence to fundamental value will be faster. 
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around future earnings announcements because around such dates value-relevant news is 
more likely. 
Based on the above analyses, our second prediction is that the drift in returns after 
earnings surprises will be larger for firms whose shares have higher transaction costs.7  
 
3. Sample selection and variable measurement  
We obtain quarterly earnings announcement dates and quarterly earnings from the 
Compustat quarterly files. We restrict the sample to earnings announcements from 
calendar years 1988 to 2005 due to the data requirements for our market microstructure 
variables, which we compute using data from the Institute for the Study of Security 
Markets (ISSM) and the NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) databases.8 We retain firm-
quarters for firms with ordinary shares (CRSP share code of 10 or 11) listed on NYSE or 
AMEX (CRSP exchange code of 1 or 2) as of the earnings announcement date. Our 
sample size is 126,386 firm-quarter earnings announcements after restricting the 
announcements to those with sufficient data to compute the variables described below. 
The restriction to NYSE and AMEX firms is for consistency with most of the prior work 
on the PEAD (Bernard and Thomas [1989, 1990], Bhushan [1994], Bartov et al. [2000], 
among others). In untabulated analyses, we find that our results are robust to the inclusion 
of NASDAQ firms. 
                                                 
7 Our analyses predict that the transaction costs may lead to underreaction in any setting in which there is a 
news event. As noted in Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny [1998] and Hirshleifer [2001], underrreaction to 
news events is a common finding in the literature. For example, in addition to earnings news, there is 
evidence of underrreaction to  stock repurchases (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen [1995]), stock 
splits (Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice [1996]), debt rating downgrades (Dichev and Piotroski [2001]), and 
analyst forecast revisions (Gleason and Lee [2003]), among others.  
8 The NYSE TAQ data is available from January 1993. The ISSM data is available from January 1983 to 
December 1992. These databases provide comprehensive microstructure data for the NYSE and AMEX 
firms in our sample. Bid and ask volumes, which are required for the cleaning of the data (see Appendix 
A), are missing from the ISSM data in 1987. Hence, we restrict our sample to January 1988 onwards. 
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3.1 MEASUREMENT OF EARNINGS SURPRISES 
Many alternative measures of earnings surprises have been used in the PEAD 
literature to develop the PEAD strategies. The traditional measure is computed as the 
seasonal change in quarterly earnings scaled by either the standard deviation of prior 
unexpected earnings or prior market value of equity (Bernard and Thomas [1989, 1990], 
Livnat and Mendenhall [2006]). We use the measure scaled by market value as this 
measure provides us with the largest sample and yields larger hedge portfolio returns on 
the PEAD strategy.9 We define earnings surprise for firm i in fiscal quarter q, UEi,q, as: 
, , 4
, 4
i q i q
i, q
i q
E EUE  
MV
−
−
−=         (1) 
where Ei,q is the most recent quarterly earnings (Compustat #8), Ei,q-4 is the quarterly 
earnings four fiscal quarters before, and MVi,q-4 (Compustat #14 x Compustat #61) is the 
market value at the end of the fiscal quarter four fiscal quarters before. After computing 
the earnings surprises, we assign firms into decile and quintile portfolios based on the 
distribution of the earnings surprises in the prior quarter. The use of the prior quarter’s 
earnings surprises distribution avoids a look-ahead bias when determining the relative 
magnitude of earnings surprises (Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin [1984]). 
3.2 MEASURES OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
In this section, we describe the measures of transaction costs that we use to assess 
the profitability of the PEAD strategy. These measures are effective spreads, quoted 
spreads, commissions, and the limited dependent variable (LDV) measure developed by 
Lesmond et al. [1999]. These measures have been used in prior research to examine the 
                                                 
9 Our main inferences remain when we use standard deviation of prior unexpected earnings as the scalar. 
With this alternative measure, we have a sample size of 96,944 earnings announcements, for which we find 
12-month hedge portfolio returns of 6.70% that reduce to 2.84% after deducting effective spreads and 
commissions. 
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profitability of other trading strategies (e.g., Knez and Ready [1996], Lesmond et al. 
[2004], Korajczyk and Sadka [2004], Hanna and Ready [2005]). As noted in Keim and 
Madhavan [1998], Lesmond et al. [2004], and many others, measures of transaction costs 
are likely to be conservative in that they only capture the estimable components of 
transaction costs. For example, they ignore the price movements induced by large trades 
of large quantities. 
The most commonly used and direct estimates of transaction costs are bid-ask 
spreads estimated using relative effective spreads or relative quoted spreads. Relative 
quoted spread measures potential transaction costs for non-executed marginal trades 
while relative effective spread measures the average transaction costs for executed 
marginal trades. One advantage of using spreads is that they are directly observable. 
Further, it is also difficult for arbitrageurs to avoid the payment of spreads by trading 
through the upstairs market because upstairs market makers screen for information-
motivated orders, and because the upstairs market is less anonymous than the downstairs 
market (Keim and Madhavan [1996]). In fact, Smith, Turnbull, and White [2001] provide 
evidence that upstairs market makers effectively screen out information-motivated orders 
(and execute large liquidity-motivated orders at a lower cost than the downstairs market). 
We use the intra-day trades and quotes from the ISSM and TAQ databases to 
calculate relative spreads. To ensure data integrity, we remove trades and quotes that are 
likely to be errors or outliers as discussed in Appendix 1.A for the ISSM database and 
Appendix 1.B for the TAQ database. 
The relative effective spread is based on the notion that trade is only costly to the 
investor to the extent that the trade price deviates from the true price, approximated by 
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the bid-ask midpoint. To compute each effective spread, we match each intraday trade to 
an intraday quote using the standard Lee and Ready [1991] algorithm described in 
Appendix 1.C. This process attempts to remove quotes for which trades have not been 
executed and could potentially reduce the noise from the transaction cost estimation. For 
each trade-matched quote at time s for firm i, we compute the intraday relative effective 
spread, IntraESpreadi,s, as:  
, , ,
,
,
2 |   -  (     ) / 2 | 
 
i s i s i s
i s
i s
trade price bid price ask priceIntraESpread
trade price
+=  (2) 
where ask pricei,s (bid pricei,s) is the ask price (bid price) for the quote at time s for firm i, 
and trade pricei,s is the trade price at which the trade is executed at time s for firm i. We 
compute the daily relative effective spreads by size-weighting the intraday relative 
effective spreads. 
The underlying assumptions of the quoted spread are that market makers set the 
prevailing quotes and stand on the other side of the customer trades, and that investors 
cannot trade within the quoted spread. For each quote at time s for firm-quarter i, we 
compute the intraday relative quoted spread, IntraQSpreadi,s, as: 
2)/ bid price (ask price
ce - bid priask price adIntraQSpre
i,si,s
i,si,s
i,s +=     (3) 
where ask pricei,s (bid pricei,s) is the ask price (bid price) at time s. We compute daily 
relative quoted spreads by equal-weighting the intraday relative quoted spreads. 
 Consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Bhardwaj and Brooks [1992], Lesmond 
et al. [2004]), we add average daily brokerage commission rates to the average daily 
relative effective (quoted) spreads. We use the standard commissions schedule from 
CIGNA Financial Services that is found in Lesmond et al. [2004]: 
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Trade size (V) Commission 
$0-$2,500 $29 + 0.017V  
$2,500.01-$6250  $55 + 0.0066V 
$6250.01-$20,000 $75 + 0.0075V 
$20,000.01-$50,000 $99 + 0.0022V 
$50,000.01-$500,000 $154 + 0.0011V 
$500,000+ $254 + 0.0009V 
  
For stocks under $1.00 per share, the commission is $38 plus 4% of trade size. The 
overriding minimum commission is $38 per trade.  
To compute the daily percent commission rate, we first obtain the average trade 
size by averaging the dollar volume of the trades within the day. We then use the average 
trade size and the above schedule to estimate the commission for an average trade. 
Finally, we estimate daily percent commission rate by dividing the commission by the 
average trade size. We then equal-weight the aggregate daily relative effective (quoted) 
spread plus percent commission rate in the earnings announcement month to estimate the 
average transaction cost, ESpread (QSpread). Brokerage commissions declined 
substantially in the later part of our sample period. To make sure that our analyses are not 
dependent on potentially overstated commission schedules, we only include the 
commission at the initiation of the arbitrage position and not at the liquidation of the 
position. The effect is to cut the commission in half.10 
Though bid-ask spreads are direct estimates of transaction costs, the literature 
emphasizes that spreads understate the true transaction costs for the arbitrageur by 
omitting relevant transaction costs such as price impact and opportunity costs. Lesmond 
                                                 
10 As a further robustness check, we have redone our analyses using spreads only and the results are 
available upon request. These (untabulated) analyses indicate that while the magnitude of the transaction 
costs is reduced, our findings are qualitatively similar. In particular, transaction costs significantly reduce 
the profitability and explain the cross-sectional variation in the abnormal returns of the PEAD trading 
strategy. 
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et al. [1999] provide an alternative and possibly more comprehensive estimate of 
transaction costs by using the transaction cost implied by investors’ trading behavior. As 
this measure is based on limited dependent variable modeling, Lesmond et al. term this 
measure LDV. Ideally, the measure captures all the costs that traders take into account 
when making their trading decisions. A maintained assumption in the model that 
estimates LDV is that arbitrageurs trade only if the marginal value of the accumulated 
information exceeds the marginal cost of trading. Given that any delayed stock price 
reaction is attributed to transaction costs, it would be tautological to estimate it using 
returns after the earnings announcements. Instead, following Lesmond et al., we calibrate 
the model using the market model with one year of daily returns that end before the 
earnings announcement month. In this setting, the maintained assumption that all 
frictions are due to transaction costs is most appealing. However, to the extent that we 
still pick up other frictions, the LDV measure may be overstated. A further discussion of 
the calculation and limitations of the LDV measure is provided in Appendix 1.D. This 
measure has also been used in Lesmond et al. [2004] to evaluate the profitability of the 
momentum trading strategy. 
3.3 OTHER VARIABLES 
For each firm-quarter, we also compute measures of asset pricing risk (firm beta, 
size, and book-to-market), investor sophistication (Institution), and arbitrage risk 
(Volatility). This is important in order to address alternative explanations for the post-
earnings-announcement-drift (Ball [1992], Bartov et al. [2000], Mendenhall [2004]). Beta 
is estimated from a market model regression for each firm with at least 18 monthly 
returns over the past 60 months ending in the month before the announcement month. 
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Size is the market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal quarter.  BEME is the 
ratio between the book value of equity and the market value of equity at the end of the 
previous fiscal quarter. Institution is the percentage ownership held by the institutional 
investors of the firm at the end of the calendar quarter before the earnings announcement. 
This data is collected from Thomson Financial. Volatility is the standard deviation of the 
residuals of a regression of daily returns on the S&P500 during the twelve months ending 
in the announcement month, with the requirement that at least 24 daily returns are 
available for the regression.11 Price is the average daily closing price of the firm in the 
announcement month. Volume is the average daily dollar trading volume of the firm 
during the earnings announcement month. Daily dollar trading volume is the product of 
the daily closing price and the daily number of shares traded, both of which are obtained 
from CRSP. Finally, market depth is computed as (the number of shares the market 
maker offers to buy x the ask price) + (the number of shares the dealer is willing to sell x 
the bid price). Intraday depth is then averaged during the day and daily depth is averaged 
during the earnings announcement month, in order to estimate the average depth, Depth. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 – panel A presents firm characteristics for each UE decile. Firms in the 
extreme deciles have higher beta and lower market values and book-to-market ratios than 
firms in the middle deciles. In addition, firms in the extreme deciles also have higher 
                                                 
11 Mendenhall [2004] defines volatility based on monthly returns over the past 48 months. We use daily 
returns to get a more timely and precise measure of volatility. Indeed, while the volatility results hold for 
both measures, the ability of volatility to explain the magnitude of the PEAD is stronger when using the 
daily volatility measure. 
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return volatility, lower institutional ownership, and lower share price. With the exception 
of book-to-market, these characteristics are relatively similar for firms in the top and 
bottom deciles. Hence, the differential returns are unlikely to be due to differences in 
expected returns. In fact, one could argue that the similarity in the risk characteristics for 
firms with extreme earnings surprises suggests that a hedge portfolio will result in a 
trading strategy with little risk exposure. This argument, however, does not hold from the 
transaction costs perspective because investors have to incur high costs on both the buy 
and the sell sides of the strategy (i.e., transaction costs cannot be ‘hedged’ away). 
Panel B presents the return and transaction cost characteristics for each UE decile. 
Though we provide evidence of abnormal returns using alternative asset pricing models 
later in the paper, we follow the tradition in the PEAD literature by using size-adjusted 
returns as the measure of abnormal returns for most of our analyses. To calculate 3-
month (12-month) abnormal returns, AbRet3 (AbRet12), we collect monthly returns from 
CRSP for the 3-month (12-month) period beginning from the month following the 
announcement month. We intentionally allow for some time between the earnings 
announcement and the portfolio formation date to allow for the possibility that informed 
investors trade during earnings announcements and move prices to the transaction cost 
bound.  
We compute the size-adjusted return for each firm by subtracting the buy-and-
hold return in the same CRSP size-matched decile from the buy-and-hold return of each 
firm, with size measured as the market capitalization at the beginning of the calendar 
year. When a security delists during the return cumulation period, we include the 
delisting return in the month of the delisting if the delisting return is available. For the 
  19
delisted firms, we reinvest the remaining proceeds in the CRSP size-matched decile until 
the end of the return cumulation period. If the delisting return is not available, we assume 
a delisting return of -100%. We then determine the average buy-and-hold return for each 
UE decile by averaging the buy-and-hold returns of all firms in the portfolio. 
Consistent with the PEAD literature, we find that equal-weighted abnormal 
returns increase from UE decile 1 to UE decile 10. Firms in the top (bottom) decile 
generate 3-month abnormal returns of 3.23% (-2.16%) and 12-month abnormal returns of 
7.33% (-4.59%), confirming previous findings that post-announcement returns are 
positive (negative) for firms releasing positive (negative) earnings surprises. Firms in the 
extreme UE deciles, however, also have higher transaction costs. For instance, the 
average ESpread (LDV) for firms in the bottom decile is 4.53% (5.69%) and 4.04% 
(6.05%) for firms in the top decile, as compared to ESpread (LDV) of 1.48% (1.93%) for 
firms in decile 5. We note that our average spreads and the LDV are similar to those 
reported by Lesmond et al. [2004, p.363].  
Panel C provides further evidence of the difficulties of implementing trades, 
especially large trades, in firms in the extreme deciles. Trades in these firms tend to 
create more price impact as measured by Depth and Volume. For example, a depth of 
$49,410 for the bottom decile suggests that on average, a buy (sell) trade of $24,705 
($49,410 / 2) will lead to upward (downward) price impact. Consistent with high 
transaction costs and high price impact for the extreme deciles, the average trade size for 
the extreme deciles tends to be small. In addition, a larger proportion of firms in the 
extreme deciles have few daily trades. For example, 21% (26%) of the firms within the 
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top (bottom) decile have an average of five or fewer daily trades in the announcement 
month, compared to 9% for decile 5. 
Panel D provides further details of the transaction cost characteristics for each UE 
decile. Specifically, we measure the first quartile, median, and third quartile of daily 
spreads in the announcement months in our sample. This result is important because it 
shows that even if one assumes that the arbitrageur is good at market timing and executes 
transactions at the bottom quartile of the distribution of trading costs within the extreme 
UE deciles, the profitability of the PEAD strategy will still be significantly reduced by 
transaction costs. We note though that this assumption is unlikely to be descriptive 
because large trades are more likely to be executed outside the quoted spreads 
(Bessembinder [2003]).  
4.2 INITIAL MARKET RESPONSE TO EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
In section 2.1, we predict that the magnitude of the market response to earnings 
surprises is smaller when transaction costs are higher because transaction costs inhibit 
informed trades that are required for price adjustment. We test this hypothesis using 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) regressions that examine the effect of the transaction 
costs on the market response to earnings surprises. Our general regression specification is 
as follows:  
Market response = β0 + β1 Surprise+ β2 Surprise x Cost + β3 Surprise x Beta + 
 Β4 Surprise x Size + β5 Surprise x BEME + ∑ βk Control Variablek + ε      (4) 
where Market Response is either AbRet3d or AbRet4q described below, Cost is either 
ESpread, QSpread, or LDV, and all the other independent variables are as defined earlier. 
We control for Beta, Size, and BEME because of prior evidence that risk and growth 
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opportunities are cross-sectional determinants of the market response to earnings 
surprises, and we include the main effect for these variables as Control Variablek (e.g., 
Collins and Kothari [1989], Easton and Zmijewski [1989]). To reduce the effect of 
outliers and to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients on the interaction terms, we 
rank Cost, Beta, Size, and BEME into quintiles within each calendar quarter and re-scale 
the ranks to range from zero to one.  
In our baseline regression we use the size-adjusted returns in the three days 
around the earnings announcement (AbRet3d) as our measure of the Market Response. 
The earnings surprise is computed using the seasonal random walk model (UE).  It is well 
known that the earnings four quarters before the earnings announcement are a noisy 
proxy of the market’s expectation of earnings. This results in a classical errors-in-
variables problem that manifests itself in low earnings response coefficients. This causes 
problems in our inferences if the noise in the earnings expectation model is related to our 
transaction costs variables. For example, it is likely that firms with high transaction costs 
have a poorer information environment, which implies that a higher fraction of the total 
earnings news is revealed at the earnings announcement date. This in turn may result in a 
higher market response at the earnings announcement, opposite to our prediction that 
transaction costs lower the market response.  
We try to address this concern in two ways. First, we extend the return window 
backwards (Kothari and Sloan [1992]). We start cumulating the size-adjusted returns 
from the second day after the earnings announcement four fiscal quarters ago (i.e., after 
the release of the lagged earnings used to construct earnings surprise) until the first day 
after the earnings announcement for the current fiscal quarter. We label this measure of 
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return AbRet4q. By lengthening the return window, we capture more of the earnings 
related news that is discovered before the earnings announcement. This reduces the error-
in-variables problem and should result in higher ERCs and fewer opportunities for bias 
related to the noise. Our second approach is to use the latest analyst consensus forecasts 
from I/B/E/S to proxy for the market’s expectation of earnings and to compute earnings 
surprise as the actual earnings per share minus the median analyst consensus forecast, 
scaled by the share price at the end of the fiscal quarter (Analyst UE) (Brown et al. 
[1987]).  
 The regression results are presented in Table 2. The first three columns present 
the results with the three-day abnormal return as the dependent variable (AbRet3d) and a 
seasonal random walk model for unexpected earnings (UE). Consistent with our 
argument above, the coefficient on the earnings surprise main effect is very small, 
indicating severe measurement error problems. When we turn to the interaction terms, 
only the results using LDV are consistent with our hypothesis that the earnings response 
coefficients are smaller for firms with higher transaction costs. However, as discussed 
above, these weak results could be a function of measurement error in the unexpected 
earnings. Thus, in the next three columns we replace the dependent variable by the yearly 
measure of contemporaneous stock returns (AbRet4q). In this case, the effects are strong 
and highly significant for effective and quoted spreads but are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero for LDV. Finally, in the last three columns, we replace the 
measure of unexpected earnings by a measure that uses analysts’ expectations of earnings 
(Analyst UE). In this case, we again find strong evidence of the negative relation between 
the earnings response coefficient and transaction costs. With the exception of column VI, 
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each of the last six columns suggests that the ERC is reduced by more than half when we 
move from the quintile with the lowest transaction cost to that with the highest 
transaction cost.12 For example, in column IV, the ERC is 6.96 for the quintile with 
lowest ESpread, and drops by 4.02, or 58%, when we move to the quintile with the 
highest ESpread. 
 Overall, the results in Table 2 are consistent with our hypothesis that firms with 
higher transaction costs have lower earnings response coefficients because transaction 
costs prevent informed trades required for the price adjustment to earnings news. 
4.3 PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS 
 Table 3 presents our profitability analyses for the PEAD strategy. Panel A (B) 
presents the analyses using equal-weighting (value-weighting). We compute profits by 
deducting the transaction costs from the abnormal returns. In particular, for firms in the 
bottom decile of unexpected earnings, we first multiply the returns by negative one (since 
the strategy takes a short position on firms in the bottom decile) and then deduct the 
transaction costs. For firms in the top decile, we subtract the transaction costs from the 
returns. EProfit, QProfit, and LDVProfit are the profits after deducting effective spreads, 
quoted spreads, and LDV, respectively. 
 In panel A, we show that firms in the top (bottom) UE decile generate 3-month 
abnormal returns of 3.23% (-2.16%) and 12-month returns of 7.33% (-4.59%). This 
implies that the PEAD strategy generates 3-month hedge portfolio returns of 5.38% and 
12-month hedge portfolio returns of 11.92%. The strategy, however, earns 3-month (12-
                                                 
12 In untabulated robustness analysis we control for potential non-linearities in the earnings-returns relation 
by including an interaction term between earnings surprise and the absolute value of the earnings surprise. 
The coefficient on this interaction term is negative and significant. However, our transaction cost results 
remain economically and statistically significant. 
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month) profits of -3.18%, -6.88%, and -6.35% (3.36%, -0.34%, and 0.19%) after 
deducting ESpread, QSpread, and LDV, respectively. The smaller profitability for the 3-
month holding period, compared to the 12-month holding period, is mainly due to the 
higher transaction costs of more frequent rebalancing with shorter holding periods. 
In panel B, we note that the abnormal returns to a value-weighted strategy are 
equal to 0.09% (2.35%) in the next three months (twelve months) subsequent to the 
earnings announcement. The substantial reduction in drift when switching from equal-
weighted to value-weighted abnormal returns is expected given that transaction costs are 
proportionally higher for smaller firms, and is consistent with the finding in prior 
literature that the PEAD is larger for small firms (Bernard and Thomas [1989, 1990]).13  
 Overall, the results in Table 3 indicate that the profitability of the PEAD strategy 
is significantly reduced after taking into account transaction costs. Another important 
implication of our above analyses is that in the presence of transaction costs, short 
holding periods for a trading strategy may result in significant losses. 
4.4 THE EFFECT OF TRANSACTION COSTS ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE 
DRIFT 
In section 2.2, we predict that the returns drift will be larger for firms whose 
shares have higher transaction costs. To test this hypothesis, we repeat the portfolio 
analysis after sorting the firms independently into quintiles based on earnings surprises 
                                                 
13 Prior research regularly excludes so-called “penny stocks” because these stocks are expected to have 
high transaction costs. Since transaction costs are the focus of our analysis, we do not exclude them in our 
main analyses. In untabulated analysis, we restrict our sample to firms whose stock prices at the fiscal 
quarter end are above $5. This reduces the sample to 110,071 observations, but the inferences are 
unchanged. For instance, we find 12-month hedge portfolio returns of 7.06%, which reduce to profits of 
3.04% after deducting effective spreads and commissions.  
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and transaction costs. We choose quintiles rather than deciles to ensure that each of the 
25 portfolios is populated. 
Table 4 – panel A presents the abnormal returns and effective spreads for the 25 
UE-ESpread portfolios and for the strategy that buys (sells) firms in the top (bottom) UE 
quintile for each ESpread quintile. We find that hedge portfolio returns are smaller than 
5% for the bottom three quintiles of effective spread (i.e., the most liquid firms), and 
8.68% and 14.61% for the top two quintiles of effective spreads. Panel A also presents 
the mean effective spreads. By construction, the mean spreads increase in the ESpread 
quintiles. Most importantly, we find that the profitability of trades within each ESpread 
quintile is generally economically insignificant. For example, the implementation of the 
strategy within the ESpread quintile 5 (1) generates abnormal returns of 14.61% (3.07%) 
but profits of only 1.02% (1.84%). Hence, despite the higher abnormal returns for firms 
with higher transaction costs, the profits are not higher and may even be lower when 
taking into account the higher transaction costs. 
Panels B and C repeat the analyses with quoted spreads and the LDV. The results 
are largely consistent with the results in panel A. That is, although abnormal returns are 
higher in firms with higher transaction costs, the profitability of the strategy within each 
transaction costs quintile is generally insignificant, and may even be negative.  
The results in Table 4 are based on size-adjusted returns, but it is important to 
assess the robustness of our findings to abnormal returns derived from alternative asset 
pricing models. Thus we repeat the portfolio analysis using portfolio time-series 
regressions of returns in excess of the risk-free rate on the commonly used Fama and 
French [1993] three-factor model. We also augment this model with the Pastor and 
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Stambaugh [2003] liquidity factor since Sadka and Sadka [2004] argue that it is liquidity 
risk, not liquidity-related transaction costs, that determines the magnitude of the PEAD. 
In addition, Sadka [2006] provides evidence that controlling for liquidity risk results in a 
significant reduction in the hedge portfolio returns from the PEAD strategy. 
For each of the 25 portfolios sorted on unexpected earnings and a particular 
transaction cost measure, we obtain the monthly hedge portfolio returns (i.e., alphas) for 
the next twelve months and regress the portfolio excess returns on the corresponding 
monthly market factors. For comparability with our earlier analyses, we multiply the 
monthly alphas by 12 to estimate the abnormal returns for 12-month periods. To compute 
12-month profits, we subtract our transaction cost estimates from the 12-month alphas. 
Table 5 – panel A presents factor alphas and factor profits for UE-ESpread 
portfolios. The alphas increase from ESpread quintile 1 to ESpread quintile 5, consistent 
with the earlier evidence that larger abnormal returns are generated by firms with higher 
transaction costs. For example, the 12-month alpha derived from the Fama and French 
[1993] three-factor model is 2.78% (11.74%) for ESpread quintile 1 (quintile 5). When 
we examine the profitability of the trading strategy, we find that the profits are largely 
insignificant and possibly even negative. For example, the profit is 1.53% (-2.89%) for 
ESpread quintile 1 (quintile 5). We also find that controlling for liquidity risk by adding 
the Pastor and Stambaugh [2003] liquidity factor has a minimal impact on the hedge 
portfolio returns. In addition, there is still substantial variation in the returns across 
quintiles of transaction costs after controlling for liquidity risk. This result suggests that 
transaction cost is an important determinant of PEAD even after controlling for liquidity 
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risk as captured by the Pastor and Stambaugh [2003] factor. Panels B and C repeat the 
analyses for portfolios sorted on QSpread and LDV, and the results are similar. 
 Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 show that the PEAD is concentrated among 
firms with high transaction costs. Most importantly, we show that the high abnormal 
returns are substantially reduced after the transaction costs are taken into account.  
4.5 DETERMINANTS OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PEAD 
In this section, we investigate the effect of transaction costs on the PEAD after 
controlling for other documented determinants of the magnitude of the PEAD. This is 
important because transaction costs and arbitrage risk can both limit arbitrage activities 
(Pontiff [2006]).14 In addition, unlike Bhushan [1994], Mendenhall [2004] finds no 
evidence that stock price, as a proxy for transaction costs such as bid-ask spreads and 
commissions, is associated with magnitude of the PEAD. We revisit this issue using our 
measures of transaction costs. 
Following the literature, we run Fama-MacBeth [1973] regressions of firm-
specific returns on the unexpected earnings and various determinants of the PEAD 
(Bhushan [1994], Bartov, Krinsky, and Radhakrishnan [2000], Mendenhall [2004]). We 
emphasize that these regressions cannot be used to determine the profitability of the 
PEAD strategy. The determination of profitability requires the deduction of transaction 
costs from abnormal returns, which is what we did in our earlier analyses. The results of 
the Fama-MacBeth regressions, however, are useful because they provide evidence on 
the incremental importance of the various determinants of the cross-sectional variation in 
                                                 
14 As discussed in greater detail in Pontiff [2006], transaction costs (e.g., bid-ask spreads) are costs that are 
incurred when trades occur whereas holding costs (e.g., arbitrage risk) are costs that are incurred as long as 
a position remains open. 
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the PEAD. Stated differently, they help us identify the characteristics of the firms that 
experience more significant drifts in returns after earnings surprises. 
We follow prior literature and replace the raw variables with their ranks in order 
to reduce the effects of measurement error. The UE variable is replaced by its quintile 
rank, recoded to range from 0 to 1 (Bernard and Thomas [1990], Bhushan [1994], Bartov 
et al. [2000]). Assuming linearity in the abnormal returns across the UE quintiles, the 
coefficient on this recoded UE quintile measures the hedge portfolio returns from buying 
(selling) firms in UE quintile 5 (UE quintile 1). Likewise, the measure of each 
determinant of the PEAD is replaced by its quintile rank and recoded to range from 0 to 
1. The interaction term between the determinant and the UE variable is then created. The 
resulting coefficient on the interaction term can be interpreted as the increase in the 
magnitude of the hedge portfolio returns attributable to a move from the lowest to the 
highest quintile of the determinant. The final regression model we estimate is: 
AbRet12 = β0 + β1 UE Quintile + ∑ βi Determinant Quintile  
+ ∑ βi UE Quintile x Determinant Quintile + ∑ βk Control Variablek + ε    (5) 
where for each firm-quarter announcement, AbRet12 is the 12-month abnormal return, 
UE Quintile is a categorical variable that ranges from 0 to 1, and Determinant Quintile is 
a categorical variable that ranges from 0 to 1 and is derived from various determinants of 
the PEAD.  
Table 6 reports the results of the Fama-MacBeth [1973] regressions. In the first 
three columns, we include only our transaction cost variables. We find that the interaction 
terms of ESpread, QSpread, and LDV are statistically significant. This finding confirms 
results in prior tables that transaction costs have a significant effect on the PEAD. For 
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instance, for firms within the bottom quintile of ESpread, the hedge portfolio returns are 
1.55%. On the other hand, the hedge portfolio returns are 13.15% (= 1.55% + 11.60%) 
for firms in the top quintile of ESpread. 
Column IV re-examines Mendenhall’s [2004] results by using price (Price) and 
trading volume (Volume) as proxies for transaction costs. It also includes proxies for 
arbitrage risk (Volatility) and investor sophistication (Institution). Our results in column 
IV are generally similar to those of Mendenhall. There is evidence of an expected 
negative cross-sectional effect of Volume, but no evidence of an effect of Price, on the 
magnitude of the PEAD. In addition, there is evidence of a positive association between 
Volatility and the magnitude of the PEAD, suggesting that the PEAD is larger among 
firms with higher arbitrage risk. 
Finally, the last three columns repeat the analysis by replacing Price and Volume 
with ESpread, QSpread, and LDV. In contrast to the results in column IV, we find that 
the transaction costs continue to explain the PEAD. One likely reason for the difference 
in the results is that we have better measures of transaction costs. For example, Lesmond 
et al. [1999] note that proxy variables for transaction costs such as price and volume 
cannot directly estimate the effects of transaction costs and that these variables may 
capture the effect of variables that are not related to transaction costs. In addition, we find 
statistically significant negative coefficients for the interaction term of Institution, 
consistent with Bartov et al.’s [2000] argument that firms whose investors are more 
sophisticated are likely to suffer from less mispricing.  
Overall, the results in Table 6 provide evidence that transaction costs create limits 
to arbitrage in the PEAD setting. 
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5. Additional Analyses 
5.1  THE EFFECT OF PRICE IMPACT ON THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PEAD 
The literature on transaction costs has emphasized the importance of taking into 
account the price impact of trades because large buy (sell) trades are likely to lead to 
significant upward (downward) price pressure (e.g., Bhushan [1994], Keim and 
Madhavan [1998], Korajczyk and Sadka [2004]). For completeness, we provide evidence 
that the abnormal returns for the PEAD strategy are also larger for firms for which trades 
have large price impacts. We use two measures of price impact – Depth and Volume – as 
described in section 3.3. 
Table 7 repeats the portfolio analysis in Table 4 after partitioning the sample 
based on the price impact measures of Depth and Volume. In contrast to Table 3, this 
table does not present profitability analyses because there is no reliable way to translate 
these measures of price impacts into percentage amounts. Panel A (B) presents abnormal 
returns for the portfolios sorted independently on UE and Depth (Volume). We find that 
the hedge portfolio returns are largely concentrated among firms for which trades have 
higher price impacts, consistent with limits to arbitrage created by implicit transaction 
costs. 
5.2  PROFITABILITY OF TRADING ON REVENUE SURPRISES AND 
EARNINGS SURPRISES 
Jegadeesh and Livnat [2006] investigate the role of revenue surprises in 
predicting differential drift levels and document two key findings: i) similar to the PEAD, 
there is a positive (negative) drift after positive (negative) revenue surprises, and ii) a 
trading strategy that buys (sells) firms with extreme high revenue surprises and extreme 
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high earnings surprises (extreme low revenue surprises and extreme low earnings 
surprises) generates higher hedge portfolio returns than the traditional PEAD strategy that 
uses only earnings surprises as a signal. We investigate the profitability of this strategy 
after taking into account transaction costs. 
Similar to our measure of earnings surprise, UE, we measure revenue surprise for 
firm i in quarter q, URi,q, as:15 
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where Ri,q is the most recent quarterly revenue (Compustat #2), Ei,q-4 is the quarterly 
revenue four quarters before, and MVi,q-4, is the market value at the end of the fiscal 
quarter four fiscal quarters before. 
In Table 8, we provide confirming evidence of the abnormal returns documented 
in Jegadeesh and Livnat [2006] using a sample of 309,254 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ 
firm-quarters from 1988 to 2005. Panels A and B present the abnormal returns, 
transaction costs, and profits of a trading strategy that relies only on revenue surprises as 
a signal. We observe from panel B that a trading strategy leveraging on revenue surprises 
generates abnormal returns of 6.59%. After deducting transaction costs, however, the 
profitability of the trades is negative. Panels C and D present similar analyses for the 
trading strategy that uses both revenue surprises (UR) and earnings surprises (UE). For 
parsimony, we only show the transaction costs of the extreme portfolios in panel D. Once 
again, we observe that profitability is significantly reduced by transaction costs. For 
                                                 
15 Consistent with our definition of earnings surprise, we assume that expected revenue follows a seasonal 
random walk, and we scale revenue surprise by market value. The main measure of revenue surprise in 
Jegadeesh and Livnat [2006] assumes that expected revenue follows a seasonal random walk with drift, and 
they scale revenue surprise by the standard deviation of prior revenue surprises. Our conclusion that 
transaction costs significantly reduce profitability is robust to this alternative measure.  
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example, the hedge portfolio return for a trading strategy that buys (sells) firms in UR 
quintile 5 and UE quintile 5 (UR quintile 1 and UE quintile 1) generates abnormal returns 
of 12.92%. The profit after deducting ESpread (LDV) is 1.73% (-2.55%). 
5.3  ANALYST EXPECTATIONS AS A BENCHMARK FOR EXPECTED 
EARNINGS 
The analyses so far were done by measuring earnings surprises as seasonal 
changes in quarterly earnings. A more recent literature, however, has documented larger 
abnormal returns with a variation of the PEAD strategy that uses analyst expectations as 
the benchmark for expected earnings (Livnat and Mendenhall [2006], Doyle et al. 
[2006]). This finding provides a tougher hurdle for the transaction cost explanation. First, 
analysts’ forecasts allow for a more precise measure of earnings surprise than a time-
series model, which should increase attainable returns. Second, firms followed by 
analysts have lower transaction costs. Thus, we assess the robustness of our results to the 
PEAD strategy documented by this recent literature. We use the Analyst UE variable 
described in section 4.2 as a proxy for earnings surprises. We then repeat the profitability 
analyses by forming portfolios based on Analyst UE.  
Table 9 presents the profitability analyses for 213,022 NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ firm-quarters for the sample period from 1988 to 2005. Panel A presents the 
analyses using equal-weighted returns. Panel A shows that firms in the top (bottom) 
Analyst UE decile generate 3-month size-adjusted returns of 3.97% (-2.36%) and 12-
month size-adjusted returns of 12.12% (-1.58%). This implies that a PEAD strategy that 
buys (sells) firms in the top (bottom) Analyst UE decile generates 3-month size-adjusted 
returns of 6.33% and 12-month size-adjusted returns of 13.70%. The strategy, however, 
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earns 3-month (12-month) profits of -1.60%, -4.38%, and -4.57% (5.76%, 2.99%, and 
2.80%) after deducting ESpread, QSpread, and LDV, respectively.  
With value-weighted returns (panel B), the 3-month (12-month) abnormal hedge 
portfolio returns are 2.66% (6.75%). In this case, the deduction of transaction costs 
reduces the 3-month (12-month) profitability of the PEAD strategy to -0.36%, -1.85%, 
and -2.02% (3.73%, 2.24%, and 2.07%) after deducting effective spreads, quoted spreads, 
and LDV, respectively. Hence, although transaction costs can account for a significant 
portion of the abnormal returns documented in Livnat and Mendenhall [2006] and Doyle 
et al. [2006], economically and statistically significant abnormal returns remain for buy-
hold periods of twelve months.  
Given that this innovation has only recently appeared in the academic literature, a 
potential explanation is that insufficient informed trading has developed for prices to 
move fully to the transaction cost bound. In Figure 1, we present evidence of the 
abnormal returns from the PEAD strategy using I/B/E/S analyst expectations. Consistent 
with the literature, we find that the abnormal returns are consistently positive, suggesting 
that a risk explanation for the drift is less likely (Bernard and Thomas [1989, 1990] Doyle 
et al. [2006]). An interesting observation from Figure 1 is that the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns appears to have declined over time and have converged to the 
magnitude of the transaction costs.16 A possible inference is that more informed trading at 
the time of the earnings announcement has led to smaller post-announcement abnormal 
returns, but the abnormal returns are not zero due to the constraints to price discovery 
created by transaction costs. 
                                                 
16 The rise in transaction costs seems counterintuitive. However, this is due to a composition effect, the 
inclusion of many smaller firms. If we constrain the sample to the S&P 500 we find the expected trend of 
declining transaction costs over time. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study how transaction costs can offer an explanation for the 
existence of the PEAD. First, we explain how an underreaction to earnings news can 
occur because transaction costs constrain the profitable trades by informed investors that 
are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price. This explanation leads to our 
first prediction that the market reaction to earnings surprises will be smaller for firms 
whose shares have higher transaction costs. We then explain how profitable trades made 
by informed investors can lead to a post-announcement drift in returns and we predict 
that the drift in returns after earnings surprises will be larger for firms whose shares have 
higher transaction costs  
Our results are generally consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find that 
earnings response coefficients are lower for firms with higher transaction costs. Second, 
using portfolio analyses, we find that the profits of implementing the PEAD trading 
strategy are significantly reduced by transaction costs. In addition, we show, using a 
combination of portfolio and regression analyses, that firms with higher transaction costs 
are the ones that provide the higher abnormal returns. Further, we provide evidence that 
the higher abnormal returns among firms with higher transaction costs do not result in 
higher profitability once transaction costs are accounted for. 
The analyses in this paper can equally be applied to other accounting-based 
anomalies, especially if the anomaly involves investing in firms with extreme 
characteristics that are indicative of high transaction costs. Our work also has 
implications for the nascent literature on directly testing behavioral theories (e.g., Chan, 
Frankel, and Kothari [2005]). Limits to arbitrage suggest that the largest mispricing will 
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occur in those stocks that are costly to arbitrage. This means that when transaction costs 
are low, we might see little mispricing even if the behavioral theory applies to the vast 
majority of investors, because any mispricing is quickly arbitraged away. In contrast, 
when transaction costs are high, the behavioral bias will be reflected in share prices, as 
arbitrageurs will abstain from trading until the mispricing becomes large enough to make 
a profit. Therefore, small firms, firms with high transaction costs, and firms with low 
institutional ownership may provide for a more powerful sample to test behavioral 
theories than a generic sample of firms. 
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Appendix 1  
1.A – Cleaning the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) database 
We use the intra-day quotes and trades from the ISSM database, which consists of a 
trades file and a quotes file, to compute the market microstructure variables from January 
1988 to December 1992. To ensure data integrity, we remove the errors and outliers from 
the files. 
 
For the trades file, we retain the following: 
1. Trades inside regular trading hours (9:30-16:00) 
2. Regular sale conditions (cond = blank) 
3. Trades with positive trade price (price > 0) and positive trade size (siz > 0) 
4. Trades with absolute change in trade price from the previous trade price of less 
than or equal to 10% 
 
For the quotes file, we retain the following: 
1. Quotes inside regular trading hours (9:30-16:00) 
2. Regular quotes (mode = blank) 
3. Quotes with positive bid price (bid > 0), positive ask price (ofr > 0), ask price 
greater than bid price (ofr > bid), positive bid size (bidsiz > 0) or positive ask size 
(ofrsiz > 0) 
4. Quotes with relative quoted spreads less than or equal to 20% 
5. Quotes with absolute change in bid price from the previous bid price in each day 
of less than or equal to 10% and with absolute change in ask price from the 
previous ask price in each day of less than or equal to 10%.  
6. For the computation of relative effective spreads only, quotes with relative 
effective spreads less than or equal to 20% 
 
1.B – Cleaning the NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database 
We use the intra-day quotes and trades from the NYSE TAQ database, which consists of 
a trades file and a quotes file, to compute the market microstructure variables from 
January 1993 to December 2003. To ensure data integrity, we remove the errors and 
outliers from the files. 
 
For the trades file, we retain the following: 
1. Trades inside regular trading hours (9:30-16:00) 
2. Good trades (corr = 0, 1) 
3. Regular sale conditions (cond = blank or *)  
4. Trades with positive trade price (price > 0) and positive trade size (siz > 0) 
5. Trades with absolute change in trade price from the previous trade price of less 
than or equal to 10% 
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For the quotes file, we retain the following: 
1. Quotes inside regular trading hours (9:30-16:00) 
2. Regular quotes (mode = 12) 
3. Quotes with positive bid price (bid > 0), positive ask price (ofr > 0), bid price 
greater than ask price (ofr > bid), positive bid size (bidsiz > 0) or positive ask size 
(ofrsiz > 0) 
4. Quotes with relative quoted spreads less than or equal to 20% 
5. Quotes with absolute change in bid price from the previous bid price in each day 
of less than or equal to 10% and with absolute change in ask price from the 
previous ask price in each day of less than or equal to 10%. 
6. For the computation of relative effective spreads only, quotes with relative 
effective spreads less than or equal to 20% 
 
1.C Matching of trades and quotes 
The matching of trades and quotes is required for the computation of effective spreads. In 
combining the trades and quotes, we take the following steps. Following Lee and Ready 
[1991], we match each trade with the latest available quote at least five seconds earlier. 
Then, as in Huang and Stoll [1997], we collapse all trades that took place at the same 
price and quotes (bid price and ask price) into a single trade. According to Huang and 
Stoll, “a large order may be executed at a single price but be reported in a series of 
smaller trades” and “a single large limit order may be executed at a single price against 
various incoming market orders”. 
 
1.D Calculation of LDV measure 
 
The LDV measure is based on the transaction costs implied by the trading behavior of 
investors and is more fully explained in Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka [1999]. It is 
assumed that informed investors do not trade when the cost of trading exceeds the value 
of the information. When this is the case, we would expect zero return on the stock. Since 
private information is not observable and cannot be used to calculate the implied 
transaction cost, the model uses the information in the market return to make its 
inferences. The correct model for security returns is assumed to be the market model, but 
trades are constrained by transaction costs. Thus the true returns of the firm will deviate 
from the measured return in cases where the value of information is too low to justify the 
transaction costs.  
 
This leads to the following model of the relation between transaction costs and the return 
of the security. First the relation between the true return and the market return follows the 
standard market model: 
 
  jtmtjjt RR εβ += **  
 
Second, the relation between the measured return, Rjt, and the true return, * ,jtR on the 
security is described by the following system: 
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For firm j, the transaction cost threshold is α1j for trades on negative information and α2j 
for trades on positive information. The difference between the two thresholds, α2j – α1j, 
provides an estimate of the roundtrip transaction costs.   
 
The model can be estimated by maximum likelihood once we make a distributional 
assumption for the error term. Following standard finance literature, the model assumes 
daily returns are distributed normally. The model is then estimated using the following 
log likelihood function. 
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The measure has two main advantages. First, when the model’s assumptions are satisfied, 
the measure incorporates all costs that are important to traders and that are reflected in 
their trading behavior. This is important because several aspects of transaction costs are 
hard to estimate directly. Second, the measure is relatively easy to compute and is 
available for any period for which daily stock returns from CRSP are available.  
 
The main disadvantage of the measure is that the estimates are based on a model and thus 
the estimates are only as good as the model that produces them. In particular, the model 
assumes that all impediments to efficient market reaction are due to transaction costs. To 
the extent that there are other behavioral or institutional factors leading to an 
underreaction to market level news, the LDV estimate of transaction costs might be 
overstated. A potentially mitigating factor is that Lesmond et al. [1999] find that the 
measure is highly correlated with directly observable measures of transaction costs. 
 
This potential overestimate might also affect our regression analysis. However, here there 
are two additional mitigating factors. First, this potential overestimate only biases the 
coefficients on the interaction terms upwards if the same forces that lead to underreaction 
relative to the market news also lead to an underreaction to earnings news. If not, then it 
is just noise which would generally lead to an attenuation bias. Second, our control 
variables, such as the percentage of institutional holdings, at least partially control for 
these other behavioral or institutional factors as well.  
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Table 1 – Characteristics of UE Deciles 
Panel A presents firm characteristics for each Unexpected Earnings (UE) decile. Panels B and C present the 
trade-related characteristics for each UE decile. Panel D presents the distribution of daily spreads during 
the earnings announcement month. The sample size is 126,386 firm-quarter earnings announcements from 
NYSE and AMEX from 1988 to 2005. Beta is estimated from a market model regression for each firm 
using at least 18 monthly returns over the five years before the announcement month. Size is the market 
value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal quarter. BEME is the ratio between the book value and the 
market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal quarter. Institution is the fraction of shares held by 
institutional investors at the end of the calendar quarter before the earnings announcement. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of the residuals of a regression of daily returns on the S&P500 returns during the 12-
month period ending in the announcement month. Price is the average close daily price in the 
announcement month. AbRet3 (AbRet12) is the 3-month (12-month) size-adjusted returns from the month 
following the announcement month. Commission is the average daily commission in the announcement 
month. ESpread is the average daily effective spread plus commissions in the announcement month. 
QSpread is the average daily quoted spread plus commissions in the announcement month. LDV is the 
comprehensive estimate of transaction costs developed by Lesmond et al. [1999]. Depth is the average 
daily quoted depth in the announcement month. Volume is the average daily dollar trading volume in the 
announcement month. Trade Size is the average daily trade size in the announcement month. Few Trades is 
the fraction of firm-quarters within each UE decile with an average of five or fewer daily trades in the 
announcement month. In panel D, Q1, median, and Q3 spreads are the first quartile, the median, and the 
third quartile of the daily spreads in the announcement month. 
 
Panel A – Firm characteristics 
 
Decile Beta Size ($M) Log BEME Institution Volatility Price ($) 
1 0.95 1,896.8 -0.39 0.40 0.11 18.52 
2 0.89 2,697.4 -0.53 0.43 0.10 23.07 
3 0.84 3,704.0 -0.70 0.45 0.09 27.20 
4 0.85 5,383.5 -0.85 0.48 0.08 31.69 
5 0.88 4,973.5 -0.86 0.50 0.09 32.82 
6 0.89 3,780.1 -0.78 0.49 0.09 30.59 
7 0.93 2,887.1 -0.65 0.46 0.10 27.05 
8 0.97 2,294.1 -0.54 0.42 0.12 23.08 
9 1.03 1,193.2 -0.36 0.34 0.15 15.49 
10 0.91 3,194.7 -0.61 0.44 0.11 24.69 
All 0.95 1,896.8 -0.39 0.40 0.11 18.52 
 
 
  44
Table 1 – Cont’d 
 
Panel B – Size-adjusted returns and transaction costs (all numbers are in %) 
 
Decile AbRet3 AbRet12 Commission ESpread QSpread LDV 
1 -2.16 -4.59 2.78 4.53 6.48 5.69 
2 -1.44 -0.17 1.64 2.80 4.33 3.63 
3 -1.00 -0.38 1.18 2.12 3.37 2.77 
4 -0.70 -0.19 0.93 1.73 2.80 2.26 
5 -0.28 0.31 0.77 1.48 2.43 1.93 
6 0.55 1.75 0.76 1.45 2.39 1.93 
7 0.81 2.92 0.86 1.60 2.61 2.19 
8 1.62 4.06 1.04 1.89 3.00 2.68 
9 1.73 5.38 1.40 2.43 3.74 3.58 
10 3.23 7.33 2.45 4.04 5.78 6.05 
All 0.27 1.69 1.00 2.31 3.60 3.10 
 
Panel C – Price impact and other trade characteristics 
 
Decile Depth ($K) Volume ($K) Trade Size ($K) Few Trades  
1 49.41 1,008.1 11.84 0.26 
2 65.76 1,857.7 16.32 0.18 
3 76.69 2,638.5 21.01 0.14 
4 88.49 3,633.5 26.45 0.12 
5 98.02 5,289.4 27.73 0.09 
6 94.09 4,891.7 30.34 0.09 
7 85.00 3,732.6 23.58 0.10 
8 78.73 2,863.3 22.41 0.12 
9 69.22 2,271.8 16.56 0.15 
10 53.29 1,180.2 12.77 0.21 
All 74.07 3,143.4 20.48 0.13 
 
Panel D – Distribution of ESpread and QSpread (all numbers are in %) 
 
Decile 
ESpread  QSpread 
Q1 Median Q3  Q1 Median Q3 
1 4.15 4.99 6.10  6.08 6.90 8.01 
2 2.55 3.06 3.71  4.05 4.57 5.22 
3 1.94 2.31 2.75  3.17 3.55 4.01 
4 1.59 1.88 2.23  2.64 2.95 3.33 
5 1.36 1.59 1.87  2.28 2.54 2.84 
6 1.32 1.56 1.83  2.25 2.50 2.80 
7 1.47 1.73 2.06  2.45 2.74 3.08 
8 1.73 2.04 2.43  2.81 3.15 3.55 
9 2.22 2.64 3.17  3.50 3.93 4.49 
10 3.73 4.45 5.42  5.45 6.16 7.12 
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Table 2 – Market Reaction to Earnings Surprises 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regressions to examine the market reaction to earnings surprises. AbRet3d is the 3-day size-
adjusted returns around the earnings announcement date. AbRet4q is the size-adjusted returns cumulated from the second day after the earnings announcement 
four fiscal quarters ago until the first day after the earnings announcement for the current fiscal quarter. Surprise is the earnings surprise measured either as UE or 
Analyst UE. UE is the earnings surprise (Surprise) measured using earnings expectation from a seasonal random walk model. Analyst UE is the alternative 
measure of Surprise using median I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecasts as the earnings expectation. All other variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** 
indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 AbRet3d AbRet4q AbRet3d 
 Surprise = UE Surprise = Analyst UE 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
Intercept 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.14*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 9.71 9.60 0.49 28.35 28.24 10.08 6.54 7.50 1.58 
Surprise 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.34*** 6.96*** 7.46*** 2.99*** 2.60*** 2.23*** 2.04*** 
 4.30 5.52 9.21 13.00 12.79 8.84 6.35 7.11 8.76 
Surprise * Beta -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.61*** 0.69*** 0.47** 0.12 0.10 0.15* 
 -0.47 -0.45 -0.07 3.20 3.53 2.38 1.46 1.23 1.68 
Surprise * Log (Size) -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.24*** -2.17*** -2.49*** 1.28*** 0.03 0.26 0.51** 
 -3.02 -4.10 -7.49 -4.92 -6.06 3.72 0.09 0.89 2.23 
Surprise * Log BEME 0.03 0.03 0.03 -2.11*** -2.05*** -2.16*** -0.37*** -0.40*** -0.41*** 
 1.25 1.32 1.17 -7.83 -7.60 -8.08 -3.58 -3.68 -3.94 
Surprise * ESpread  0.04   -4.02***   -1.68***   
 1.28   -8.45   -4.56   
Surprise * QSpread   0.01   -4.65***   -1.27***  
  0.23   -9.87   -4.77  
Surprise * LDV    -0.13***   0.15   -1.11*** 
   -5.41   0.42   -6.18 
Main effect for Determinant 
included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.04 
OBS 126,386 126,386 126,386 126,386 126,386 126,386 95,299 95,299 95,299 
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Table 3 – Profitability Analyses for PEAD Trading Strategy 
Panel A (Panel B) presents the profitability analysis using equal-weighted (value-weighted) abnormal returns and transaction costs. The sample size is 126,386 
firm-quarter earnings announcements from NYSE and AMEX from 1988 to 2005. AbRet3 (AbRet12) is the 3-month (12-month) size-adjusted returns from the 
month following the announcement month. ESpread is the average daily effective spread plus commissions in the announcement month. QSpread is the average 
daily quoted spread plus commissions in the announcement month. QProfit3 (QProfit12) is AbRet3 (AbRet12) minus QSpread. EProfit3 (EProfit12) is AbRet3 
(AbRet12) minus ESpread. LDVProfit3 (LDVProfit12) is AbRet3 (AbRet12) minus LDV. All other variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate two-
tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
Panel A – Equal-weighted profitability 
 
 Three-month holding period  Twelve-month holding period 
 AbRet3 EProfit3 QProfit3 LDVProfit3  AbRet12 EProfit12 QProfit12 LDVProfit12 
Short 1 -2.16 -2.37 -4.32 -3.54  -4.59 0.06 -1.89 -1.10 
Buy 10 3.23 -0.81 -2.56 -2.82  7.33 3.29 1.55 1.29 
Hedge 5.38*** -3.18*** -6.88*** -6.35***  11.92*** 3.36*** -0.34 0.19 
t-stat 8.99 -5.36 -10.98 -9.50  9.38 2.79 -0.28 0.15 
 
 
Panel B – Value-weighted profitability 
 
 Three-month holding period  Twelve-month holding period 
 AbRet3 EProfit3 QProfit3 LDVProfit3  AbRet12 EProfit12 QProfit12 LDVProfit12 
Short 1 0.38 -1.50 -2.24 -2.20  0.49 -1.62 -2.36 -2.31 
Buy 10 0.47 -0.53 -1.22 -1.30  2.84 1.84 1.15 1.07 
Hedge 0.09 -2.04*** -3.47*** -3.50***  2.35* 0.22 -1.21 -1.24 
t-stat 0.12 -2.69 -4.47 -4.60  1.67 0.16 -0.86 -0.88 
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Table 4 – Profitability Analyses for UE and Transaction Cost Portfolios 
This table presents the 12-month size-adjusted returns and transaction costs for portfolios sorted 
independently on unexpected earnings and transaction costs. Panels A, B and C present the analysis using 
ESpread, QSpread, and LDV, as the respective measures of transaction costs. The sample size is 126,386 
firm-quarter earnings announcements from NYSE and AMEX from 1988 to 2005. All variables are defined 
in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
Panel A – Partition by ESpread 
 ESpread Quintile  
UE Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
AbRet12      
1 -0.17 -0.58 0.09 -1.13 -4.84 
5 2.90 1.24 4.88 7.55 9.78 
5-1 Return 3.07*** 1.82* 4.79*** 8.68*** 14.61*** 
ESpread      
1 0.62 0.97 1.45 2.37 6.76 
5 0.61 0.98 1.44 2.35 6.83 
5-1 Profit 1.84* -0.14 1.90* 3.95*** 1.02 
 
Panel B – Partition by QSpread 
 QSpread Quintile  
UE Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
AbRet12      
1 -0.29 -0.16 0.05 -0.95 -4.93 
5 3.89 1.16 6.31 6.19 9.92 
5-1 Return 4.17*** 1.32 6.26*** 7.14*** 14.85*** 
QSpread      
1 1.05 1.67 2.45 3.93 9.51 
5 1.04 1.66 2.44 3.89 9.60 
5-1 Profit 2.09** -2.01* 1.37 -0.67 -4.26** 
 
Panel C – Partition by LDV 
 LDV Quintile  
UE Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
AbRet12      
1 -0.72 -0.38 -0.73 -1.90 -4.10 
5 2.31 2.18 3.76 6.59 9.90 
5-1 Return 3.03** 2.56** 4.49*** 8.49*** 14.00*** 
LDV      
1 0.76 1.44 2.11 3.36 8.48 
5 0.74 1.45 2.11 3.33 9.00 
5-1 Profit 1.53 -0.34 0.28 1.80 -3.48** 
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Table 5 – Annualized Alphas and Profits for UE and Transaction Cost Portfolios 
This table presents annualized alphas and profits for a hedge portfolio that buys (sells) firms in the top 
(bottom) quintile of unexpected earnings. The sample size is 126,386 firm-quarter earnings announcements 
from NYSE and AMEX from 1988 to 2005. The annual alphas and profits are computed for each of the 
five quintiles of transaction costs. Panels A, B and C present the analysis using ESpread, QSpread, and 
LDV as the respective measures of transaction costs. FF 3-factor alpha (Carhart 4-factor alpha) is the 
estimated intercept of a regression of the portfolio monthly excess return on the market premium, SMB, 
and HML (market premium, SMB, HML, and the momentum factor – UMD), multiplied by 12. PS 4-factor 
alpha is the estimated intercept of a regression of the portfolio monthly excess return on the market 
premium, SMB, HML, and the Pastor and Stambaugh [2003] liquidity factor, multiplied by 12. In panels A, 
B, and C, the corresponding factor profit numbers are the alphas minus the transaction costs estimated 
using ESpread, QSpread, and LDV, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** 
indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
Panel A – Partition by ESpread 
 
 ESpread Quintile 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FF 3-factor alpha 2.78* 1.66 5.81*** 8.60*** 11.74*** 
PS 4-factor alpha 2.47 1.50 5.77*** 8.48*** 11.48*** 
      
FF 3-factor profit 1.53 -0.35 2.73 3.51* -2.89 
PS 4-factor profit 1.21 -0.53 2.66 3.31* -3.31 
 
Panel B – Partition by QSpread 
 
 QSpread Quintile 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FF 3-factor alpha 3.30* 1.47 6.21*** 7.69*** 11.85*** 
PS 4-factor alpha 3.01* 1.30 6.23*** 7.63*** 11.53*** 
      
FF 3-factor profit 1.22 -1.94 1.08 -0.60 -8.53*** 
PS 4-factor profit 0.90 -2.14 1.06 -0.76 -9.04*** 
 
Panel C – Partition by LDV 
 
 LDV Quintile 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FF 3-factor alpha 2.10 2.70* 5.00*** 8.76*** 10.75*** 
PS 4-factor alpha 1.82 2.51* 4.71*** 8.66*** 10.38*** 
      
FF 3-factor profit 0.48 -0.39 0.35 1.28 -8.81*** 
PS 4-factor profit 0.18 -0.61 0.00 1.09 -9.43*** 
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Table 6 – Determinants of PEAD – Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
This table presents mean estimated coefficients and t-statistics for 72 quarterly regressions of 12-month size-adjusted returns (AbRet12) on measures of firm 
characteristics, transaction costs, and price impact. The sample size is 126,386 firm-quarter earnings announcements from NYSE and AMEX from 1988 to 2005. 
All variables are defined in Table 1. The variables are ranked into quintiles every year and then recoded from 0 to 1. T-statistics are presented in italics below the 
estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Intercept 5.04*** 5.61*** 1.95 -3.08 3.70** 3.03* -0.80 
 3.90 3.94 1.30 -1.59 2.32 1.88 -0.50 
Beta 0.84 0.91 0.89 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.80 
 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.72 
Log Size -0.38* -0.46** -0.09 0.08 -0.35* -0.35* -0.01 
 -1.91 -2.16 -0.48 0.25 -1.68 -1.71 -0.07 
Log BEME 2.47*** 2.49*** 2.38*** 2.07*** 2.29*** 2.29*** 2.18*** 
 3.59 3.64 3.50 3.22 3.41 3.42 3.25 
UE Quintile 1.55 2.02* 1.87* 10.83*** 2.96* 4.36*** 4.63*** 
 1.45 1.87 1.87 5.00 1.87 2.99 3.52 
ESpread Quintile * UE Quintile 11.60***    7.73***   
 6.86    3.65   
QSpread Quintile * UE Quintile  10.76***    5.54***  
  6.25    2.68  
LDV Quintile * UE Quintile   10.94***    7.27*** 
   6.40    3.15 
Price Quintile * UE Quintile    -3.95    
    -1.63    
Volume Quintile * UE Quintile    -4.31**    
    -2.32    
Institution Quintile * UE Quintile    -1.96 -2.63 -4.00** -3.79** 
    -1.11 -1.47 -2.43 -2.34 
Volatility Quintile * UE Quintile    4.38* 3.06* 3.87** 1.63 
    1.92 1.72 2.15 0.76 
Main effect for Interaction included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
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Table 7 – Returns Analyses for UE and Price Impact Portfolios 
This table presents twelve-month size-adjusted returns for portfolios sorted independently on unexpected 
earnings and price impact measures. The sample size is 126,386 firm-quarter earnings announcements from 
NYSE and AMEX from 1988 to 2005. Panels A and B present the analysis using Depth and Volume, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance 
at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
 
Panel A – Partition by Depth 
 
 Depth Quintile 
UE Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 -3.09 -3.27 -1.34 -1.08 -0.40 
5 9.17 7.92 4.85 3.12 3.72 
5-1 Return 12.26*** 11.19*** 6.19*** 4.20*** 4.12*** 
 
Panel B – Partition by Volume 
 
 Volume Quintile 
UE Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 -4.91 -1.82 -0.68 0.20 1.05 
5 8.32 10.63 3.97 0.81 3.03 
5-1 Return 13.23*** 12.45*** 4.66*** 0.61 1.98* 
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Table 8 – Profitability Analyses for UR and UE Trading Strategies 
This table presents profitability analyses for trading strategies based on unexpected revenue (UR) and 
unexpected earnings (UE) portfolios. The sample size is 309,254 firm-quarter earnings announcements 
from NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1988 to 2005. Panel A presents the abnormal returns and 
transaction cost estimates for the UR deciles. Panel B presents the profitability analyses for a trading 
strategy that buys (sells) firms within the highest (lowest) UR decile. Panel C presents the 12-month size-
adjusted returns for five-by-five portfolios sorted independently on UR and UE.  Panel D presents the 
profitability analysis for a trading strategy that buys (sells) firms in UR quintile 5 and UE quintile 5 (UR 
quintile 1 and UE quintile 1). In this panel, ESpread, QSpread, and LDV are used as different measures of 
transaction costs. All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
Panel A – Size-adjusted returns and transaction costs (all numbers are in %) 
UR Decile AbRet3 AbRet12 Commission ESpread QSpread LDV 
1 -1.49 -1.26 2.04 5.93 7.85 7.73 
2 -0.82 1.55 1.43 4.17 5.66 5.50 
3 -0.36 -0.42 1.21 3.40 4.60 4.52 
4 -0.08 0.49 1.02 2.82 3.82 3.77 
5 0.03 1.44 0.93 2.57 3.52 3.47 
6 0.25 2.61 0.91 2.61 3.58 3.59 
7 0.62 3.17 0.92 2.71 3.73 3.84 
8 1.20 4.27 0.98 2.93 4.02 4.23 
9 1.61 4.05 1.06 3.23 4.42 4.81 
10 2.50 5.33 1.27 3.85 5.20 6.00 
All 0.32 2.12 1.23 3.40 4.58 4.57 
 
Panel B – Profitability analyses for trading strategy based on UR 
UR Decile AbRet12 EProfit QProfit LDVProfit 
Short 1 -1.26 -4.67 -6.59 -6.47 
Buy 10 5.33 1.47 0.13 -0.67 
Hedge 6.59*** -3.19* -6.46*** -7.14*** 
t-stat 4.03 -1.95 -3.96 -4.18 
 
Panel C – 12-month abnormal returns (AbRet12) for UE and UR quintile portfolios 
 UR Quintile  
UE Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 
1 -2.99** -3.51* -1.41 -2.34** -3.52** 
2 -0.51 -2.05** 0.01 0.14 -0.05 
3 1.16 -0.05 0.86 2.25** 1.48 
4 4.73*** 5.11*** 4.62*** 5.04*** 5.40*** 
5 4.75*** 4.52** 6.91*** 9.91*** 9.40*** 
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Table 8 – cont’d  
 
Panel D – Transaction costs in the extreme UE and UR quintiles  
 
 UR Quintile 
UE Quintile 1 5 1 5 1 5 
 ESpread QSpread LDV 
1 5.67 4.95 7.55 6.67 7.30 6.80 
5 6.29 3.88 8.22 5.19 9.08 6.50 
55-11 Return 12.92*** 12.92*** 12.92*** 
55-11 Profit 1.73 -1.88 -2.55 
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Table 9 – Profitability Analyses of PEAD Trading Strategy Using Analyst Expectation as Earnings Benchmark 
Panel A (panel B) presents the profitability analysis of the PEAD trading strategy using equal-weighted (value-weighted) returns and transaction costs. The 
sample size is 213,022 firm-quarter earnings announcements from NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1988 to 2005.  The earnings surprises portfolios are 
formed using Analyst UE. Analyst UE is the difference between I/B/E/S EPS and I/B/E/S consensus analyst median EPS forecast scaled by price at the end of the 
fiscal quarter. All other variables are defined in Table 3. *, **, and *** indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
Panel A – Equal-weighted profitability 
 
 Three-month holding period  Twelve-month holding period 
 AbRet3 EProfit3 QProfit3 LDVProfit3  AbRet12 EProfit12 QProfit12 LDVProfit12 
Short 1 -2.36 -2.27 -3.90 -3.66  -1.58 -3.05 -4.68 -4.44 
Buy 10 3.97 0.67 -0.48 -0.91  12.12 8.82 7.67 7.24 
Hedge 6.33*** -1.60*** -4.38*** -4.57***  13.70*** 5.76*** 2.99*** 2.80*** 
t-stat 16.51 -3.63 -9.89 -9.72  12.96 5.32 2.75 2.69 
 
Panel B – Value-weighted profitability 
 
 Three-month holding period  Twelve-month holding period 
 AbRet3 EProfit3 QProfit3 LDVProfit3  AbRet12 EProfit12 QProfit12 LDVProfit12 
Short 1 -1.28 -0.57 -1.46 -1.48  -0.70 -1.14 -2.03 -2.05 
Buy 10 1.38 0.20 -0.39 -0.54  6.05 4.87 4.27 4.13 
Hedge 2.66*** -0.36 -1.85** -2.02***  6.75*** 3.73** 2.24 2.07 
t-stat 3.72 -0.51 -2.57 -2.91  4.67 2.57 1.53 1.44 
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Figure 1 – Abnormal Returns and Transaction Costs by Year 
This figure presents mean abnormal returns (AbRet12) and effective spreads plus commissions (ESpread) 
by calendar year for the PEAD trading strategy. The earnings surprises portfolios are formed using Analyst 
UE. Analyst UE is the difference between I/B/E/S EPS and I/B/E/S consensus analyst median EPS forecast, 
scaled by price at the end of the fiscal quarter. AbRet12 is the 12-month size-adjusted returns from the 
month following the announcement month. ESpread is the average daily effective spread plus commissions 
in the announcement month.   
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